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In reading Barthes’ Myth Today, one is struck early on by his relentless deconstruction of the terminology and meaning of the “myth.” Barthes’ exhaustive picking apart of the functioning elements of this “type of speech” reduce it to an unrecognizable state and gradually leave the reader with the impression that he or she no longer has any idea what a myth is or could be.
The essay goes on, however, to reconstruct and redefine myth according to Barthes’ convictions; soon he explains that contemporary myth serves to depoliticize things and make them seem “natural” rather than derived from political and historical contexts. When he claims that the only type of language able to counteract the whitewashing effects of myth is language that remains political or seeks to transform reality, it is suddenly easy to begin to view his aforementioned preliminary deconstruction of “myth” as a performative prelude to the essay—wherein he works from the outset to establish himself as a “reality transformer” (in redefining conventional understandings of myth).
However, in terms of Barthes’ assertion that “revolutionary language cannot be mythical,” it seems difficult to understand what precise characteristics differentiate an instance of language that seeks to “transform reality” from an instance that does not. One could easily assert that an utterance of any kind will necessarily transform reality, based on the simple fact of its new existence. If it is contended that the intention of the speaker is necessary for language to be considered “revolutionary,” what is to be made of the possibility that one speaker’s “mythic” intentions could be misinterpreted or mistranslated, with reality-transforming results? Or, if one believes in a “complexity of human acts” that should result in a complete range of innumerable possible instances of speech (and, therefore, limitlessly variable expressions of the intensity of one’s desire for transformation), how can we possibly devise a reliable way to distinguish “myth” from “revolution” according to Barthes’ terms?